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COMBATTING AIDS DISCRIMINATION IN
HEALTH INSURANCE
MARC E. ELOVITZ*
How can we stop health insurance discrimination against peo-
ple living with HIV? My response to this question focuses on the
specific issue of HIV-related limitations on health benefits; but it
is important to recognize the broader context. The debate over
HIV-related discrimination in health insurance is part of a much
larger debate over the need for our health care system to provide
better care to a greater number of people.1 Hopefully, this larger
debate will not end despite last year's failure to enact national
health care reform legislation.
When we address the issue of AIDS, HIV, and insurance under
the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"),2 we are not gener-
ally talking about the challenge of access for everyone. Thus, the
question that will be addressed here is not whether every per-
son-or even every person with HIV-will be guaranteed health
care. 3 Rather, it is whether people will be afforded equal treat-
ment under the existing systems of coverage. 4
The problem of HIV-related insurance caps and exclusions has
been with us since early in the AIDS epidemic and shows little
signs of abating. People living with HIV, as well as their advo-
* Marc E. Elovitz is staff counsel of the American Civil Liberties Union's National AIDS
Project where he litigates cases regarding all aspects of AIDS and the law, including dis-
crimination in employment, housing, and public accommodations. B.A., Wesleyan, Univer-
sity, 1986; J.D., New York University School of Law, 1990.
1 See Donna E. Shalala, Health-Care Reform Must Include Insurance Coverage for AIDS
Victims, PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 1, 1993, at A17. Shalala expressed the opinion that McGann
v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1991), inspired the government to reform the
health care system so that people living with HIV and enduring personal crises may main-
tain the protection of health insurance. Id. See also Laurie Garrett, Clinton Forms AIDS
Task Force, NEWSDAY, Dec. 1, 1993, at 7;ABA Working Group Submits White Papers on Key
Issues to Hillary Rodham Clinton, HEALTH CARE POL'Y REP. (BNA) No. 24, at D-7 (Aug. 16,
1993).
2 42 U.S.C. § 12111 et seq. (Supp. V 1993).
3 See generally Anna M. Rappaport, Policy Environment for Health Benefits: Implica-
tions for Employer Plans, 43 DEPAUL L. REv. 1107, 1111 (1994).
4 See Robert E. Stein, The Rights of Employees with AIDS: The Conflict between the Need
for Adequate Insurance Coverage and Individual Privacy in the Workplace, 10 ST. JosS J.
LEGAL CoamsNT. 557, 558 (1995).
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cates, must pursue aggressive strategies to stop these unjustified
and damaging practices. I will focus on the fairly narrow issues of
combatting such discrimination under the Employment Retire-
ment Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA")5 and the ADA.
Most of the current analysis of HIV-related health insurance
caps and exclusions concerns itself solely with the ADA. But prior
to the enactment of the ADA, such caps and exclusions were chal-
lenged under ERISA. In two federal circuit Court of Appeals deci-
sions,6 ERISA was held to provide no remedy for this type of dis-
crimination. Rather than settling the law in this area, as others
have either assumed or explicitly argued, ERISA still presents a
viable cause of action when a benefit plan is modified to include an
HIV-related cap or exclusion. As precedent, the two decisions are
binding only on the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits-the Supreme
Court has never ruled on this issue. It is my position that these
two cases were wrongly decided because the courts failed to refer
to basic principles of contract law which, contrary to the assump-
tions of many commentators and courts, may be referred to when
deciding a claim under ERISA.7
The theories that I would encourage people to use in the future
under ERISA, concomitantly with ADA claims, are contract theo-
ries. First, a reliance argument8 that someone in the position of
the plaintiff in, for example, the McGann9 case, had reasonably
relied on a term, an amount of insurance coverage, and that by
changing that term after the defendant became aware of the AIDS
condition caused the plaintiff to suffer a detriment. 10
The other argument is that changing a policy to incorporate an
HIV-related cap or exclusion is unconscionable and therefore un-
5 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (Supp. V 1993).
6 Owens v. Storehouse, 984 F.2d 394, 397 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding that ERISA does not
forbid company from canceling insurance benefits that are neither vested nor accrued); Mc-
Gann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401, 407 (5th Cir. 1991) (affirming that company could
alter terms of medical plan to limit benefits available for AIDS-related claim after it discov-
ered that one of its employees had AIDS), cert. denied., 113 S. Ct. 482 (1992).
7 See Samuel A. Marcosson, Who is "Us" and Who is 'Them" - - Common Threads and the
Discriminatory Cut-Off of Health Care Benefits for AIDS Under ERISA and the Americans
With Disabilities Act, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 361, 372 (1994).
8 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1983).
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance
on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or
forbearance of injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.
Id.
9 McGann, 946 F.2d at 403.
10 See Marcosson, supra note 7, at 370-85.
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enforceable. 1' The unconscionability principle is about unfair sur-
prise. It is difficult to imagine much more of a surprise than
knowing that one has a million dollars in health benefits avail-
able, submitting a claim and then having the maximum benefit
reduced to five thousand dollars based on the nature of the
claim.' 2 The unfairness stems from the lack of monetary justifica-
tion for treating the HIV disease differently from other conditions.
HIV disease costs far less to treat than most individuals, employ-
ers and insurance companies often assume, 13 and comparatively
less than the treatment of other conditions. Thus, the question is
not whether it would save an insurance plan money not to treat
AIDS, because of course it would, but whether the analysis is done
fairly in comparison to the treatment of other conditions. If treat-
ing AIDS does not cost more than other conditions, then the sur-
prise of a new AIDS-only coverage limitation is an unfair one and
therefore unconscionable.
The failure to consider common law contract principles to iden-
tify a source of contractual obligation is outside of established pre-
cedent in at least two circuits. The Court of Appeals for both the
Sixth Circuit' 4 and the Seventh Circuit' 5 have decided cases
under ERISA relying on common law contract principles, such as
11 See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CoNTRAcTs §§ 4.27, 4.28 (2d ed. 1990).
12 See, Marcosson, supra note 7, at 388-99.
13 See, e.g., Judith K Barr & Robert A. Padgug, Employers and AIDS: Meeting the
Health Benefit Needs of People with HIV Disease, 3 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 83, 96-97
(1994) (pointing out that cost of treating HIV sufferer from time of infection to death is
approximately $119,000, which is no more costly than many other catastrophic diseases);
Randall R. Bovberg, AIDS and Insurance: How Private Health Care Coverage Relates to
HIVIAIDS Infection and to Public Programs, 27 IowA L. REV. 1561, 1574 (1992) (reporting
that less than 5% of Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans' spending on claims is directed to
AIDS-related care); William A. Bradford, Jr. et al., The AIDS Epidemic and Health Care
Reform, 27 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 279, 300 (1994) (observing that National Commission on
AIDS has predicted spending for AIDS will never rise above 2% of total medical spending in
United States); Michael T. Isbell, AIDS and Access to Care: Lessons for Health Care Re-
formers, 3 CORNELL J. L. & PuB. POL'Y 7, 13 (1994) (explaining that early fears that AIDS
epidemic would bankrupt health care system have proven baseless and noting that as of
1993, medical spending on people with HIV constituted only 1% of U.S. health care
spending).
14 See Armistead v. Vernitron Corp., 944 F.2d 1287, 1298-1300 (6th Cir. 1991) (ruling
that employer had no right to terminate employee's insurance benefits under collective bar-
gaining agreement). Accord, Vespasian v. Sweeney, No. 93-4343, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS, at
*12-14 (6th Cir. Apr. 6, 1995) (recognizing applicability of equitable estoppel doctrine to
ERISA claim, but holding that facts did not fulfill threshold requirements to allow
recovery).
15 Black v. TIC Inv. Corp., 900 F.2d 112, 112 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding estoppel principles
apply to claims for benefits under unfunded single-employer welfare benefits plans pro-
vided for under ERISA).
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equitable estoppel. There is no justification for not doing so in
cases involving HIV-related caps and exclusions.
Turning to the ADA, the guiding principle is that people cannot
be treated differently based on disability. 16 As to health insurance,
this prohibits unjustifiably singling out particular disabilities for
denial of coverage. A rule of construction, Section 501(c), ad-
dresses issues of insurance in detail. 17 The rule of construction
explains that the ADA's rules of non-discrimination allow insurers
to continue their traditional functions of underwriting, classifying
and administering risks, so long as their decisions are based on
sound actuarial data.' 8 This rule avoids unfair treatment based on
false assumptions about the comparative costs of treating AIDS as
well as unfair treatment based on antipathy towards people living
with AIDS.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") has
made a valiant attempt to start addressing the issue of HIV-re-
lated caps and exclusions, both in its interim policy guidance 19
and in lawsuits.20 Few of these cases have reached the stage of a
judicial evaluation on the merits because the defendants have
been settling for fairly small amounts.2 ' My fear is that this is
16 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (Supp. V 1993). Section 12112(a) provides:
No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability
because of the disability of such individual in regard to ... employee compensation...
and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.
Id.
Section 12112(b)(2) provides:
'[D]iscriminate' includes participating in a contractual or other arrangement or rela-
tionship that has the effect of subjecting a covered entities qualified applicant or em-
ployee with a disability to the discrimination prohibited by this subchapter... [includ-
ing] . . . a relationship with . . . an organization providing fringe benefits to an
employee of the covered entity.
Id.
17 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (Supp. V 1993).
18 42 U.S.C. § 12201 (Supp. V 1993).
19 EEOC, EEOC INrnM ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON THE APPLICATION OF THE AMERI-
CANS wrrH DisABLrrIs AcT OF 1990 To DISABILTY-BASED DISTINCrIONS m EMPLOYER PRO-
VIDED HEALTH INSURANCE (1993).
20 E.g., EEOC v. Mason Tenders Welfare Trust Fund, et al., No. 93 Civ. 1154 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 19, 1993) (challenging health and welfare fund's plan provision denying payment of
medical expenses for any illness that is AIDS-related); EEOC v. Lee Data Corp., CV94-
3875 (C.D. Cal. June 9, 1994) (challenging lifetime cap of $100,000 on AIDS-related treat-
ments where other illnesses have lifetime caps of $1,000,000).
21 See, e.g., EEOC v. Tarrant Dist., Inc., H-94-3001 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 11, 1994) (requiring
defendant to lift AIDS-cap, pay unpaid medical bills of employees subject to cap, and do-
nate $20,000 to American Foundation for AIDS Research); EEOC v. Conn. Ref. Co., 62
U.S.L.W. 2595, 2595 (Mar. 9, 1994) (settling for $35,000 in compensatory damages for dis-
criminatory insurance practices). The plan challenged allowed for up to$ 1 million in medi-
cal coverage for most disabilities, but limited coverage for HIV/AIDS-related sickness to
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leading insurance providers to consider the price of settlement to
be just another cost of doing business. That is unacceptable. We
cannot spend another ten years settling these cases for small
amounts while letting businesses deny benefits to people living
with HIV until those businesses are dragged into court.
Instead, both the EEOC, and private organizations and private
plaintiffs, need to challenge HIV-related caps and exclusions and
force either very large settlements, so that defendants learn that
this is wrong and they won't get away with it, or bring the cases to
trial and set strong precedent both as to the illegality of such poli-
cies and as to financial penalties that will result from them.
While the primary focus of this symposium is employment is-
sues, the Carparts22 case highlighted the issue of combatting in-
surance discrimination under the ADA's public accommodations
provision. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
in Carparts held that the multi-employer insurance plan was cov-
ered under the employment section of the ADA, and in remanding
the case noted that the plan might also be covered under the
ADA's public accommodations provision. The First Circuit re-
jected the district court's outright dismissal of the public accom-
modations claim because it disagreed with the assumption that a
public accommodation must be a physical structure.23 The statute
does not refer to buildings, walls, floors or ceilings: "Neither Title
III [the public accommodations provision] nor its implementing
regulations make any mention of physical boundaries or physical
entry."24 In Carparts, the First Circuit correctly noted that:
To exclude this broad category of businesses from the reach of
Title III and limit the application of Title III to physical struc-
tures which persons must enter to obtain goods and services
would run afoul of the purposes of the ADA and would se-
$10,000. Id.; see also, Kadinger, No. CIV-3-93-159 (allowing $50,000 settlement for dis-
criminatory practices which permitted coverage up to $500,000 for all conditions except
AIDS).
22 Carparts Distribution Ctr., Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler's Ass'n, 37 F.3d 12, 18-19
(1st Cir. 1994) (rejecting district court interpretation that public accommodation was lim-
ited to physical structures with actual boundaries).
23 Id. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (Supp. V 1993).
No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and
equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommo-
dations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases
to), or operates a place of public accommodation.
Id. The statute, however, does not clearly define public accommodation. Id.
24 Carparts, 37 F.3d at 20.
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verely frustrate Congress' intent that individual's with disa-
bilities fully enjoy the goods, services, privileges and advan-
tages available indiscriminately to other members of the
general public.25
In conclusion, there are important questions of law to be ad-
dressed in the fight against HIV-related insurance discrimination,
such as whether contractual theories can make ERISA claims via-
ble, whether the EEOC and private litigants will demand higher
settlements for ADA claims in order to prevent HIV-related caps
and exclusions from becoming an acceptable cost of doing busi-
ness, and whether other courts will follow the First Circuit's anal-
ysis of the coverage of insurance plans under the ADA's public ac-
commodations provision. But, we should also be focusing on why
providers are placing caps and exclusions on HIV-related benefits
and what justifications they offer. Describing it as exercising their
right to put a particular insurance product on the market makes it
seem bland and noncontroversial; but offering plans with AIDS-
only limitations has no actuarial basis and therefore contravenes
any notion of fairness. The federal government, private individu-
als, and public interest organizations continue to press that issue.
But we are left asking when employers, insurance companies, and
other entities that provide health insurance benefits will admit
there is no justification for these limitations and drop them. How
many people living with HIV will needlessly suffer in the
meantime?
25 Id.
